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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the disqualification of Appellant's, James Kevin 
Buell's (hereafter called "Buell") commercial driving privileges for one year 
following entry of a plea of guilty to a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004, 
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On October 21, 2006, Buell was arrested and charged with DUI; on 
December 22, 2006, Buell pled guilty to the DUI in consideration of the 
prosecution's dismissing a Refusal matter. 
On February 27, 2007, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the 
sentencing. 
On July 10,2007, a judgment was entered and the driving privileges 
were backdated to October 21,2006. 
On July 19, 2007, Buell was served with a notice of disqualification 
by the Transportation Department. 

















On August 3 I , 2007, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Preliminary Order were issued sustaining the I year disqualification of 
operation of a commercial motor vehicle. 
On September 7,2007, the Idaho Transportion DepaIiment moved for 
reconsideration of the retroactivity aspects of the Order by Officer Howell. 
On October 5,2007, ITO notified Buell's counsel that the 
disqualification commenced July 10,2007. 
On October 10, 2007, Buell filed a petition for Judicial Review. 
On December 29,2009, the District Court filed an Opinion and Order 
Regarding Appeal denying relief. 
On February 5, 2010, Buell filed an appeal with the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 21, 2006, Buell was arrested and charged with DUI 111 
Bonner County, Idaho. ALS Hrg. Transcr. 6: 1 0-13 (Aug. 31, 2007). He 
refused the breath test. Id. at 7:2-6. See also Notice of Suspension, attached 
to Buell's Second Motion for Addition/Correction to Agency Record. 
On November 15, 2006, in Buell's civil refusal case, CV-2006-1861, 

















stipulated that Buell would retain his driving privileges until a BAC/Refusal 
hearing was held. See Supplemental Agency Record, dated August 23, 
2008. However, said stipulation did not indicate whether it was referring to 
regular driving privileges, commercial driving privileges, or both. 
On December 22, 2006, Buell pled guilty to the DUI. ALS Hrg. 
Transcr. at 11 :9-1 7. He agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the 
prosecuting attorney dismissing the refusal matter and requesting that the 
Court relate the suspension back to the date of arrest. Buell likely would not 
have pled guilty under any other circumstances. Id. at 8:5 - 9:5. 
On February, 27, 2007, the parties stipulated to a continuance of 
Buell's our sentencing to give Buell additional time to make arrangements 
with his employer so as not to jeopardize his employment. See 
Supplemental Agency Record, dated August 23, 2008. 
On July 10, 2007, a Judgment was entered in Buell's DUI matter, 
Bonner County Case No. CR-2006-6261. The Court did suspend Buell's 
driving privileges for 90 days but, in accordance with the parties' agreement, 
backdated the suspension to October 21, 2006. See Judgment, attached as 
Exhibit A to Buell's Motion for Addition/COlTection to Agency Record. 
Following entry of the Judgment, the Idaho Transportation 


















2007. See Supplemental Agency Record, dated August 23, 2008. Said 
notice stated that Buell would be disqualified from operating a commercial 
vehicle for one year beginning August 6, 2007, based on his July 10, 2007 
our conviction. 
Buell requested an administrative hearing, which was conducted by 
Hearing Examiner Michael B. Howell (hereafter "Howell") on August 3 I, 
2007. During that hearing, Buell testified that the reason he agreed to plead 
guilty was because the prosecuting attorney agreed to dismissal the refusal 
action and to request that the Court backdate Buell's DUI license suspension 
to October 2 I, 2006. ALS Hrg. Transcr. at 8:5 - 9:5. 
During the ALS hearing, Buell's counsel argued that: 
1. When the judge in the underlying DUI matter relates a 
suspensIOn back to an earlier date, ITO must also relate back any 
administrative suspension to that earlier date; 
2. I.C. § 49-335 is unduly punitive (i.e. it violates double 
jeopardy); and 
3. I.C. § 49-335 violates due process by depriving drivers with 
commercial licenses, who were not driving a commercial vehicle at 


















Id. at 13:9 - 16:23. Also, it was explained that Buell was without any 
driving privileges from November 2 I, 2006 (which was 30 days after his 
arrest) to July 10, 2007. Id. at I 1:4 - 12:25. Further, it was explained that, 
at the time of the administrative hearing, Buell still did not have commercial 
privileges because of the notice from ITO. Id. at 12:25 - 13:4. 
On August 31, 2007, Howell issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Preliminary Order. Howell sustained Buell's one-year 
disqualification from operating a commercial motor vehicle. However, he 
found that Buell had ceased having commercial driving privileges on 
November 21, 2006, and recommended that the administrative 
disqualification be made retroactive to that date. 
On October 3, 2007, Buell's counsel was speaking with Howell on 
another matter, and Howell mentioned that ITO had filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the recommendation that Buell's suspension be made 
retroactive. Counsel wrote ITO requesting a copy of said Motion for 
Reconsideration. A copy of that Motion was then received by counsel on 
October 5, 2007, although it was dated September 7, 2007. See 
Supplemental Agency Record dated August 23,2008. 
The ITO Motion requested reconsideration of retroactive application 


















any commercial or non-commercial suspension or disqualification. Counsel 
was also served with a letter dated October 5, 2007 from ITO to Howell 
withdrawing its Motion for Reconsideration because it had determined that 
the backdating of the disqualification was merely a recommendation and, 
therefore, the department had determined that it was not bound to comply 
with that recommendation. Id. 
In an October 5, 2007 letter from ITO to Buell's counsel, Driver 
Services Manager, Edward Pemble, advised that ITO had backdated Buell's 
non-commercial suspension to the date of arrest in accordance with the our 
Judgment. However, it was lTD's position that, based on the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration rules and regulations, the start of Buell's 
commercial disqualification must coincide with his July 10, 2007 our 
conviction date. 
Buell then filed his Petition for Judicial Review on October 10, 2007. 
On October 15, 2007, this Court issued an Exparte Order staying Buell's 
commercial disqualification pending judicial review. 
III. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether a commercial disqualification under I.C. § 49-335 

















under the multi-factored Hudson analysis, it is so punitive in effect that it is 
transformed into a criminal penalty. 
2. Whether Buell's commercial disqualification should be 
retroactive to November 21, 2006 because the statutes are ambiguous as to 
when his commercial disqualification began running, because Buell believed 
he did not have commercial privileges as of November 21, 2006, and 
because imposing an additional disqualification as of his DUI conviction 





Administrative License Suspensions/Disqualifications Pursuant to 
I.C. § 49-335 Violate Double Jeopardy Principles Because, Although 
Civil in Nature, Under the Multi-Factored Hudson Analysis, They are 
so Punitive in Form and Effect that they are Transformed into 
Criminal Punishments. 
The double jeopardy analysis used in State v. Talavera was improper. 
Under the correct, multi-factored analysis, license suspensions under I.C. § 
49-335( 1) do violate double jeopardy. 
In 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an administrative driver's 
license suspension under I.C. § 18-8002A does not violate double jeopardy. 
State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho 700 (1995). Although the present case involves 

















335(1), Talavera would be applicable, at least in part, given that it also dealt 
with an administrative license suspension. 
Two years after Talavera, the United States Supreme Coul1 in large 
part disavowed the cases and analysis relied on in Talavera and reverted to 
the prior long-standing multi-factored double jeopardy analysis. Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). Since the Hudson decision, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has not reconsidered whether an administrative license 
suspension violates double jeopardy. 
In Talavera, the Court relied heavily on us. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 
(1989), and its progeny. Talavera, 127 Idaho at 703-705. In doing so, the 
Court held that a 90-day administrative license suspension, with the 
possibility of a restricted permit after 30 days, is not disproportionate to the 
remedial goal of the statute. Id. at 705. 
In Hudson, the United States Supreme Court stated that Halper's 
"deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill considered." 
522 U.S. at 101. Further, the Court cited several problems with the Halper 
double jeopardy analysis: 
1. The analysis bypassed the threshold question of whether the 


















2. The analysis wrongfully assessed the character of the actual 
sanction imposed rather than evaluating the statute on its face 
to determine whether it amounted to a criminal sanction; 
3. The analysis elevated one factor (proportionality) to dispositive 
status when no one factor should be controlling; and 
4. The analysis had proven unworkable. 
Id. at 101-102. 
Therefore, the Hudson Court re-established that the correct double 
jeopardy analysis was the analysis that existed prior to Halper and as 
outlined in Us. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) and Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96. That analysis 
involves the following steps: 
1. Determining whether the sanction IS criminal or civil by 
evaluating statutory construction and both express and implied 
legislative intent; and 
2. Where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a 
civil penalty, a multi-factored inquiry is used to determine 
whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or 
effect that it transformed what was clearly intended as a civil 



















See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (citing Ward; Kennedy; and Rex Trailer v. Us., 
350 U.S. 148 (1956)). 
Two recent Idaho cases have used the multi-factored Hudson analysis 
rather than the truncated Halper/Talavera analysis. See State v. McKeelh, 
136 Idaho 619 (Ct. App. 2001; State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 137 P.3d 461 
(Ct. App. 2005)). Although Gragg was an ex post facto case rather than a 
double jeopardy case, the same analysis applies to both doctrines. Gragg, 
137 P .3d at 465. Therefore, the previous double jeopardy analysis set forth 
in Talavera should be re-evaluated in light of current precedent. 
Hudson involved administratively imposed monetary penalties and 
occupational debarment sanctions for violations of federal banking statutes 
against petitioners who were later criminally indicted for the same conduct. 
522 U.S. at 95. In evaluating whether the statute allowing for the monetary 
penalties and debarment violated double jeopardy, the Court first analyzed 
whether Congress had intended the statute to be criminal or civil in nature. 
ld. at 103. The Court noted that the statute contained no language explicitly 
denominating the sanctions as civil. ld However, the Court held that the 
fact that the legislature conferred authority on an administrative agency to 
impose the sanctions was prima facie evidence that Congress intended to 

















second step of the Double Jeopardy analysis to determine whether the 
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect that it 
transformed what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty. Id. at 104- I 05. 
Based on Hudson, conferring authority on an administrative agency is 
prima facie evidence that the legislature intended the penalties to be civil. 
Therefore, because ITO has been given the authority to suspend, disqualify, 
and revoke regular and commercial driving privileges, the court should 
undertake the second prong of the Hudson analysis, that is whether the 
statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect that what was 
intended as a civil remedy was transformed into a criminal punishment. 
Citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), Hudson 
reiterated the following list of factors to be used as guideposts during the 
second prong of the inquiry: 
1. Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint; 
2. Whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; 
3. Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 
4. Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment - retribution and deterrence; 



















6. Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it; and 
7. Whether the sanction appears excessIve In relation to the 
al ternati ve 
purpose assigned. 
522 U.S. at 99-100. However, "these factors must be considered in relation 
to the statute on its face" and must provide "the clearest proof' in order to 
override legislative intent and transform the sanction into a criminal penalty. 
ld. at 100. 
With regard to the present case, four of the seven factors indicate that 
suspensions under 18-8002A are so punitive in form and effect that they 
have been transformed into a criminal punishment. 
A. Whether Driver's License Suspensions have been Historically 
Regarded as Punishment. 
This inquiry differs from determining the legislative intent regarding a 
particular sanction under the first prong of the analysis. Rather, sanctions 
can serve more than one purpose. See Talavera, 127 Idaho at 704 (quoting 
Austin v. Us., 509 U.S. 602 (1993). Therefore, this factor requires looking 
beyond the legislative intent inquiry to an inquiry of how this type of 
sanction has been viewed historically. 
In Hudson, the Court stated that "revocation of a privilege voluntarily 


















U.S. at 104. The Court held that a banking industry debarment fell within 
that category. Id. However, such a debarment is very different from a 
driver's license suspension in Idaho. Idaho courts have recognized a 
driver's license as a right, not a mere privilege. Idaho's Constitution, Article 
I, Section 1, states as follows: 
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain 
inalienable rights, among them are enjoying and defending life 
and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; 
pursuing happiness and securing safety. 
Further, due process analysis requires courts to "first determine whether 
there has been State action" and then "determine whether that State action 
deprives a person of a right enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment." 
State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 649 (Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, in order for 
a state action to violate due process, it must violate a right of an individual. 
In State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1 (1985), the Court found that: 
Because the suspension of issued driver's licenses involves 
State action that adjudicates important interests of the licensee, 
driver's licenses may not be taken away without procedural due 
process. 
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion, Justice Shepard wrote: 
I suggest that neither of those cases provide any authority for 
the validation of a statute which authorizes the preemptory 
seizure by a field police officer of a valuable property right 



















Id. at 6 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Ankney Court recognized that a 
driver's license was a fundamental and valuable property right. Thus, state 
action taking away that right was subject to due process constraints. 
Because Idaho recognizes a driver's license as a right, under Hudson, the 
suspension of a driver's license has a punitive criminal element. Further, in 
the case of the suspension/disqualification of a commercial driver, there is 
the added impact on the driver's ability to make a living. 
Even the Talavera Court accepted that an administrative driver's 
license suspension does have a punitive criminal element. There, the Court 
pointed out that punishment "serves the twin aims of retribution and 
deterrence" and then went on to acknowledge the deterrent aspects of an 
administrative license suspension. ld. at 703, 705 (quoting Halper). 
Suspensions of drivers' licenses have long been criminal punishment 
for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, driving without 
privileges, vehicular homicide, and minor in possession of alcohol. 
Therefore, based on the fact that a driver's license is considered a valuable 
property right and that driver's license suspensions clearly serve a deterrent 
purpose and have been historically utilized as criminal punishments, this 
factor weighs in favor of a finding that I.C. § 49-335 suspensions violate the 
















B. Whether the Operation of a Driver's License Suspension 
Promotes the Traditional Aims of Punishment (Retribution and Deterrence). 
It is clear that a driver's license suspension promotes retribution and 
deterrence. As discussed above, Talavera acknowledged that suspensions 
under 18-8002A promote the traditional goals of punishment. 127 Idaho at 
703-705. In addition, the Court stated that the Idaho Department of 
Transportation had acknowledged the deterrent effect of license suspensions. 
Id. The suspension/disqualification of commercial privileges promotes 
retribution and deterrence, as well, and perhaps even more so given the 
added impact on the driver's ability to earn a living. Therefore, this factor 
weighs in favor of finding a double jeopardy violation. 
C. Whether the Behavior to Which the Driver's License 
Suspension Applies is Already a Crime. 
Suspensions/disqualifications under I.C. § 49-335(1) are to be 
imposed if the driver is convicted under state or federal law of several 
crimes, including driving under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the 
behavior to which the suspension/disqualification applies is already a crime 
under 18-8004, 18-8004A, and 18-8004C, and this factor also weighs in 
favor of finding a double jeopardy violation. 
D. Whether an Alternative Purpose to Which the Suspension May 
Rationally be Connected is Assignable to it and Whether the Suspension is 


















This discussion combines the last two factors in the Hudson analysis, 
which are the only two factors evaluated in Talavera. Although Talavera 
was evaluating suspensions under I.C. § 18-8002A, it is still relevant to this 
discussion since both 18-8002A and 49-335 deal with administrative license 
suspensIOns. 
In Talavera, the Court held that I.C. § 18-8002A had the remedial 
purpose of expeditiously removing from the highways drivers who have 
been driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limits 
provided in 18-8004. See Talavera, 127 Idaho at 705. Similarly, SB 1001, 
which became I.C. 49-335, stated that one of the purposes of the statute was 
to remove problem drivers from the road by disqualifications. Further, the 
Talavera Court held that a 90-day driver's license suspension, with the 
possibility of a restricted permit after the first 30 days, was not 
disproportionate to the remedial purpose. Talavera, 127 Idaho at 705. 
The Talavera Court's analysis was flawed for two reasons. First, as 
discussed above, it relied on the truncated Halper analysis, which the 
Hudson Court later disavowed. 
Second, Talavera focused on the specific sanction that was imposed 
in that case, that is a 90-day suspension. However, in Hudson, the Court 
















sanctions imposed." 522 U.S. at 101 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963)). This method of analysis is 
unworkable because it will never conclusively resolve whether a particular 
statutory scheme is punitive: 
It will not be possible to determine whether the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is violated until a defendant has proceeded 
through a trial to judgment. But in those cases where the civil 
proceeding follows the criminal proceeding, this approach flies 
in the face of the notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
forbids the government from even attempting a second time to 
punish criminally. 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102 (internal quotations omitted). In Seling v. Young, 
the Court reiterated that an "as applied" analysis is improper because the 
nature of a sanction cannot be altered "based merely on vagaries in the 
implementation of the authorizing statute." 531 U.S. 250,263 (2000). 
Rather, the proper method of analysis is to consider the second prong 
factors "in relation to the statute on its face" and not in relation to how the 
statute was implemented with regard to a specific individual. Hudson, 522 
U.S. at 100. Therefore, in looking at whether the sanctions set forth in I.C. 9 
49-335 are disproportionate to the remedial purpose of the statute, we must 
look at more than just the possibility of a one year disqualification, such as 
the one Petitioner faces. Rather, we must look at all potential suspensions 



















they could be imposed. In addition to one year disqualifications, I.C § 49-
335 also provide for scenarios under which a driver may be disqualified for 
life. Further, the statute provides for commercial disqualification without 
regard for whether the driver was operating a commercial or non-
commercial vehicle. This disqualification without regard for whether the 
driver actually using his commercial privileges at the time and the potential 
for lifetime disqualification clearly cross the line into the punitive realm and 
are disproportionate to the remedial purpose of the statute. 
In Hudson, the Court found that the civil sanction at issue there was 
not so punitive in purpose and effect that it had been transformed into a 
criminal penalty. 522 U.S. at 104-105. However, there, the Court found that 
only two of the seven factors weighed in favor of the sanction being a 
criminal penalty. Id. Those two factors were those discussed under 
subparagraphs (b) and (c) above. The Court stated that those two factors, 
alone, were insufficient to render a sanction criminal. Id. at 105. See also 
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619 (Ct. App. 2001). 
However, in the present case, four out of the seven factors support a 
finding that the effect of commercial suspensions/disqualifications under 
I.C. § 49-335 are so punitive that they are transformed into criminal 



















needed to justify overriding legislative intent: 1) generally, driver's license 
suspensions have been viewed historically as punishment; 2) the operation 
of a driver's license suspension promotes the traditional goals of 
punishment; 3) the underlying behavior to which the suspension applies is 
already a crime; and 4) the various suspension possibilities are 
disproportionate to the remedial purpose of the statute. 
Therefore, under the correct analysis re-adopted in Hudson, I.C. § 49-
335 is punitive and violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
II. Due Process and Estoppel Principles Require that Buell's Commercial 
Disqualification be Retroactive to November 21, 2006 Because I.C. 
§§ IS-S002, IS-S002A, and 49-335 are Ambiguous as to When the 
disqualification of Buell's Commercial Privileges Began, Buell 
Believed his Disqualification Began on November 21, 2006, and 
Imposing an Additional Disqualification as of his Conviction Date 
Would, Therefore, Subject Buell to a Commercial Disqualification of 
Nearly Twenty Months. 
In the present case, the entire statutory scheme involving refusing or 
taking and failing an evidentiary test is ambiguous as applied to commercial 
drivers such as Buell. Because of the ambiguous nature of the statutes 
related to refusing an evidentiary test, Buell believed his commercial license 
was suspended as of November 21, 2006. Therefore, lTD should be 





















As explained above, Idaho courts have recognized that drivers have a 
valuable property right in their licenses. See State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1 
(1985). Therefore, commercial drivers have an even greater property 
interest In their commercial licenses because they provide a source of 
livelihood. As such, deprivation of ability to operate a commercial vehicle 
is subject to due process constraints. See Jd. at 3 (holding that driver's 
licenses may not be taken away without procedural due process). 
In both the civil and criminal contexts, statutes are ambiguous and 
violate due process when they do not adequately advise citizens of the law. 
See State v. Korsen, 13 8 Idaho 706, 711 (2003 ) (a statute defining criminal 
conduct must be "worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited); see also Cowan 
v. Bd. of Com mrs. of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247, 1259-
60 (2006) (in a civil context, a statute violates due process "where its 
language is such that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning). 
In the present case, the entire statutory scheme involving refusing or 
taking and failing an evidentiary test is ambiguous as applied to commercial 
drivers. I.e. §§ 18-8002 and 8002A provide that, if a driver refuses the 




















temporary permit allowing driving privileges until the date of a refusal 
hearing but, in no event for more than 30 days. The statutes also provide 
that no temporary permit will be issued to "a driver of a commercial vehicle 
who refuses to submit to or fails to complete an evidentiary test." 
The wording of this statute, and therefore of the suspension advisory 
form, is confusing because, while it mentions that drivers of commercial 
vehicles will not be issued temporary permit if they refuse the test, it does 
not affirmatively specify what happens to commercial drivers who were 
driving non-commercial vehicles. 
I.C. § 49-335(2) states: 
Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who 
holds a class A, B or C driver's license is disqualified from 
operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less 
than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or submits 
to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or 
other intoxicating substances concentration while operating a 
motor vehicle. 
However, unlike lS-S002/S002A, I.C. § 49-335(2) does not provide for any 
30-day temporary permit period. Rather, from reading the plain language of 
49-335(2), it appears a driver's commercial privileges may be suspended for 
one year from the moment they refused the test. 
Citizens are presumed to have knowledge of laws. Therefore, Buell is 



















was disqualined from operating a commercial vehicle from the moment he 
refused the evidentiary test. Further, the law stated in §§ 18-8002 and 
8002A and contained in the Notice of Suspension advisory form, is 
ambiguous because did not affirmatively advise Buell that his commercial 
privileges were not suspended as soon as he refused the evidentiary test. It 
would violate due process to presume a citizen knows the law when statutes 
addressing similar topics appear to be contradictory. 
Although Buell's commercial disqualification by ITO is based on § 
49-335( 1) and his conviction for DUI, rather than on § 49-335(2) and his 
refusal of the evidentiary test, such distinctions are confusing to the average 
citizen. The subtle nuances and various reasons for potential administrative 
suspensions aside, Buell believed his commercial license was suspended 
because of the fact that he refused the evidentiary test. Therefore, at the 
time of the administrative hearing, Buell believed he had already served a 
nine month suspension of his commercial privileges. This belief was caused 
by the confusing and ambiguous statutory scheme. 
The confusing and ambiguous nature of the statutory scheme is 
evidenced not only through the testimony at the administrative hearing that 
Buell thought his commercial privileges were suspended as of November 21, 





















but also by the Hearing Examiner's finding that Buell had been without 
commercial driving privileges since November 21, 2006. 
Buell believed his commercial privileges were suspended beginning 
30 days following his refusal. Therefore, if lTD imposes another full year of 
commercial disqualification beginning on his July 10, 2007 DUI conviction 
date, Buell will effectively have undergone a 19 112 month disqualification 
(7 112 months from November 21, 2006 through July 10, 2008, plus the 
additional one year beginning July 10, 2008). 
Buell believed his commercial privileges were suspended from 
November 21, 2006, through the hearing date of August 31, 2007. He 
continued under the assumption that his privileges were suspended until 
October 15, 2008, when this Court stayed his commercial disqualification 
pending the outcome of judicial review. Therefore, lTD should be estopped 
on due process grounds from imposing any additional disqualification 
against Buell and, at the most, should only be allowed to impose an 






















Appellant respectfully requests relief in accord with the above-listed 
argument. 
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